Kitāb al-ʿIlm/Section II
However, the duty incumbent upon Islamic scholars is to inform such a person, in a systematic and gradual manner, that the ḥajj is obligatory for every person of means. It is the responsibility of every Islamic scholar to warn him in this regard. For perhaps this person, inclining towards taqwa (God-consciousness), may wish to fulfill the obligation of ḥajj as soon as possible. When he harbors such an intention, it becomes obligatory for him to learn the specifics of the ḥajj. What is obligatory to learn are only the obligatory and necessary (wājib) aspects of the ḥajj. Knowing the supererogatory (nafl) aspects is not obligatory, but merely recommended; for knowledge of the supererogatory never becomes individually obligatory (farḍ ʿayn). As for whether scholars are responsible if the obligation of ḥajj itself is not mentioned to this person, the necessary information is provided in the books of fiqh.
The knowledge required for other acts of worship is also, just like the ḥajj, gradual. As for prohibitions (things that must not be done), the obligation to know them depends on the circumstances and varies from person to person. For example, a mute person does not need to learn about things that are forbidden to say. A blind person is not obliged to learn about things that are forbidden to look at. Likewise, a nomadic person is not obliged to know about places where residence is forbidden. These prohibitions also change according to the requirements of the present situation. Therefore, it is not obligatory for a person to know about a prohibition that is distant and impossible to encounter.
However, one must pay attention to the prohibitions present in one’s current situation. For example, if a person, upon becoming Muslim, is wearing a silk garment, or is living in a house he has usurped, or is looking at a woman who is not his maḥram, it is obligatory to inform him that all these are forbidden. It is also obligatory to teach him about prohibitions that he is not currently engaged in but is close to (such as eating and drinking). Indeed, if he lives in a town where drinking wine and eating pork are customary, it is obligatory to teach him that these are forbidden and to warn him. Other things that must be taught should also be taught to him immediately. As for beliefs (ʿitiqād) and the actions of the heart, the obligation to learn them depends on the state of the heart.
If a person has doubts about the meanings indicated by the testimony of faith (kalimat al-shahāda), it is obligatory for him to acquire the knowledge that will remove that doubt, according to Muḥammad and the Ḥanbalīs. However, Abū Ḥanīfa, Imām Mālik, and Abū Yūsuf hold the opposite view, and according to them, it is not permissible to delay the ḥajj for those who meet its conditions.
It is obligatory for him to learn from the Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn. But if such a doubt does not enter his heart, and if he dies before knowing matters such as the eternity of Allah’s speech, that the believers will see Allah’s beauty in the Hereafter with their eyes, that Allah is not subject to events, and similar matters that must be believed, then by consensus of all scholars, this person has died as a Muslim. These doubts that corrupt beliefs and enter the heart sometimes exist in human nature. But sometimes a person may be led into such doubts by the people of the town in which he lives. Therefore, if a person lives in a town where people are engaged in kalām (theology) and constantly speak about innovations (bidʿa), he must protect himself from these innovations as soon as he becomes morally responsible (ʿāqil-bāligh).
If a false idea settles in his heart, he must immediately uproot it. However, it is often very difficult to uproot a falsehood from the heart. Again, if this person is a merchant and transactions based on usury are widespread in his town, it is obligatory for a merchant living in such a town to learn very well the knowledge of how to avoid usury. This analysis we have made regarding knowledge that is farḍ ʿayn expresses the truth; for the meaning of knowledge that is farḍ ʿayn is to know the specifics of the obligatory act. Therefore, a person who knows the obligatory knowledge and when it becomes obligatory also knows the knowledge that is farḍ ʿayn.
It is also correct that the Sufis (ṣūfīs) say that the knowledge that is farḍ ʿayn is to know and distinguish between the whisperings of the enemy (Satan) and the inspiration of the angel. However, their saying this does not apply to all members of the community; this measure is a condition only for those who have devoted themselves to this path. Since a person is often unable to escape from ostentation (riyāʾ) and envy (ḥasad), which lead to evil, it is obligatory for him to know, to the extent of his need, the things that lead to destruction. How could it not be obligatory for a Muslim to know at least this much? The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said:
Kitāb al-ʿIlm/Section II
Three things destroy the human being: miserliness that is obeyed, desires that are followed, and a person’s admiration of himself. It is not so easy for people to save themselves from these destructive traits. The states of the heart, such as arrogance (kibr), self-admiration (ʿujb), and similar ugly traits, which we will detail later, are connected to the three destructive causes mentioned above. Uprooting these from the heart is farḍ ʿayn. Their removal is only possible by knowing their states and fulfilling their causes. Since it is impossible to do this without knowing the cause and the effect, it is necessary to know the cause and the reason. Unfortunately, most people have neglected these farḍ ʿayn among the destructive traits we have mentioned because they are preoccupied with useless things.
It is necessary to teach a person who has become Muslim, after faith (iman), belief in Paradise, Hell, resurrection, and life after death. For a person who does not believe in these has not completed the testimony of faith (kalimat al-shahāda). Furthermore, after affirming that Muḥammad is the Messenger, it is necessary to know what he has conveyed, namely, that Paradise is for those who obey Allah and His Messenger, and Hell is for those who rebel. If one reflects on what we have said, there remains no doubt that this is the right path, and it becomes clear that every servant who is swept along by the currents of day and night is not free from new events arising in his acts of worship and transactions. New obligations will befall him, and he must ask and learn about every new event that arises, even if only a little.
He must also ask and learn about events that are likely to occur and act quickly in this regard. Since, in the ḥadīth of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), “Seeking knowledge is obligatory upon every Muslim man and woman,” the knowledge meant by the word “knowledge” is the knowledge of the act that is obligatory for Muslims, it follows that this knowledge—68) Bayhaqī, Shuʿab al-Īmān; Bazzār and Ṭabarānī (from Anas)—
It has thus become clear that the study of the Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn has a gradual character and that its obligation is dependent on time. Knowledge that is Farḍ Kifāya Since it is not possible to know with certainty which knowledge is obligatory and which is not unless the sciences are divided into sections, it is necessary to classify the sciences according to their characteristics in order to reach a correct conclusion. Sciences are essentially divided into two: religious (sharʿī) sciences and non-religious sciences. By religious (sharʿī) sciences, the knowledge brought by the prophets is meant, which cannot be acquired by reason like mathematics, by experiment like medicine, or by hearing like language. Non-religious sciences are divided into three: praiseworthy (maḥmūd), blameworthy (madhmūm), and permissible (mubāḥ) sciences.
Praiseworthy (maḥmūd) sciences are those that improve worldly affairs, such as medicine and arithmetic. These are further divided into those whose study is farḍ kifāya (collectively obligatory) and those whose study is meritorious. The part that is farḍ kifāya is the sciences necessary for the improvement of worldly affairs (such as medicine, which is necessary for maintaining bodily health, and arithmetic, which is necessary for commercial transactions, wills, and inheritance). If there are no people in a country who know these sciences, all the people of that country are considered sinful. But if there is even one person in a town who knows these sciences, the obligation is lifted from the others and the responsibility to learn is removed.
Do not be surprised that we say medicine and mathematics are farḍ kifāya; for, like these two sciences, the essential sciences of agriculture, weaving, politics, medicine, tailoring, and other crafts are also farḍ kifāya. If there are no doctors in the land of Islam to treat people, Muslims will perish; and because they have led themselves to destruction, they are all collectively responsible. For Allah, who gives the disease, also gives its cure. He has also bestowed upon humankind the ability to find that cure. Therefore, in the land of Islam, there must be enough people who know the aforementioned sciences—
Kitāb al-ʿIlm/Section II
to meet the need. Not learning this is to leave Muslims to disaster, which is in no way correct. As for sciences that are not obligatory but whose study is meritorious, these are delving into the details (subtleties) of the sciences we have mentioned, and occupying oneself with fine and delicate points that are not fundamentally necessary. (Indeed, because having deep knowledge in these sciences brings great benefit to Muslims, scholars who have specialized in these fields have been highly valued.) As for blameworthy (madhmūm) sciences, these are the arts of magic, talismans, hypnotism, sleight of hand, and feats of illusion. Permissible (mubāḥ) sciences are those that relate to poetry and the histories of nations, informing about historical events. As for the religious (sharʿī) sciences we have tried to explain, all of them are acceptable.
However, sometimes there are things thought to be religious sciences but in fact have nothing to do with religious sciences; these are essentially blameworthy (madhmūm) sciences. Acceptable sciences are divided into four sections: uṣūl (principles), furūʿ (branches), muqaddimāt (preliminaries), and mutammimāt (completions). First Section (Uṣūl): a) The Book (Qur’an) b) The Sunnah c) The Consensus of the Community (ijmāʿ al-umma) d) The Traditions (āthār, sayings of the Companions). The authority of the Consensus of the Community is based on its reliance on the Sunnah. Therefore, the Consensus of the Community is a third-degree proof. The Traditions (āthār) are also based on the Sunnah, just like the Consensus. For the Companions (ṣaḥāba) saw the Messenger of God (peace be upon him) directly, and thus, compared to others, they understood the indications of circumstances much better. Often, words are incapable of expressing the realities that circumstances wish to indicate.
This is why scholars have considered adhering to the measures conveyed in the words and actions of the Companions and not departing from these measures as among the foundations of the sharia (sacred law).
Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn confirms this. Of course, there are certain conditions for this, but it is not appropriate to mention these conditions here. Second Section (Furūʿ): The branches are derived from the aforementioned principles. However, these are not obtained by words, but by sharp intellects. The understanding and perception of those who grasp these subtle meanings are so broad that they can derive meanings beyond those expressed by the spoken words. For example, from the ḥadīth of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), “A judge must not pass judgment when angry,” it has been deduced that a woman, when pressed by the need to relieve herself, or when sick or hungry, also should not pass judgment. The branches are divided into two: 1. Sciences related to worldly matters: These are dealt with in the books of fiqh, and those who occupy themselves with these are jurists (fuqahāʾ).
The jurists are scholars of the world (those who know and solve worldly affairs). Sciences related to the Hereafter: These are the sciences that inform about the ugly and beautiful aspects of character and the states of the heart. These sciences inform about the states that are acceptable or unacceptable to Allah. Indeed, the last section of this book clarifies this subject. The effect of spiritual acts of worship and customs on the limbs is also explained in this section. Third Section (Muqaddimāt): These are sciences such as lexicography and grammar, which serve to convey an idea or thought. For the sciences of lexicography and grammar are the most necessary tools to help us know the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger. In essence, the sciences of lexicography and grammar are not part of the religious sciences.
However, knowing and mastering these two sciences is a great necessity for knowing and learning the religious sciences well. For the Book of Allah was revealed in the Arabic language. Therefore, the sharia can only be understood by those who know the Arabic language in all its details. For this reason, knowing the vocabulary of the language in which the divine sharia was revealed is a primary factor in knowing the sharia. (Bukhārī, Muslim, from Abū Bakr)
Kitāb al-ʿIlm/Section II
One of these tools is also the knowledge of writing, but knowing how to write is not so necessary; for the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) was unlettered and did not know how to write. If a person can memorize everything he hears, he does not need to know how to write. But for those who lack such a quality, knowing how to write is often necessary and required. Fourth Section (Mutammimāt): This is a situation that arises in the sciences of the Qur’an. For the sciences of the Qur’an, with regard to words, are divided into the articulation points of the letters, learning tajwīd, and, with regard to meaning, into the science of tafsīr (Qur’anic exegesis), which is also acquired by hearing and transmitted to others, just like the sciences of lexicography and grammar. For the science of lexicography alone is not sufficient for the science of tafsīr.
There are also sciences of the Qur’an, with regard to its rulings, such as abrogating and abrogated (nāsikh and mansūkh), general and specific (ʿāmm and khāṣṣ), explicit and apparent (naṣṣ and ẓāhir), and how some verses can be used with others. This is called the science of uṣūl al-fiqh. This science also includes the Sunnah. As for the complementary elements in the reports from the Companions, these are knowing the transmitters of the reports, their names, genealogies, and the names and characteristics of the Companions. Knowing the personal states of the transmitters, to distinguish between those who are upright, trustworthy, and weak; knowing their ages, to distinguish between mursal and musnad ḥadīth, and so on. All these together are called religious (sharʿī) sciences, and all are acceptable and permissible sciences.
Indeed, all these sciences are included among the sciences that are farḍ kifāya. If I am asked why I have described the science of fiqh as a worldly science, I would say: Allah the Exalted created Adam from earth, his progeny from clay, and from a drop of ejected fluid. He transferred them from the loins of men to the wombs of mothers, from the wombs of mothers to the world, from the world to the grave, from there to the place of reckoning, and from there to Paradise or—70) Ibn Marduwayh (from ʿAbdullāh b. ʿUmar); Ibn Ḥibbān, Dāraquṭnī, Ḥākim and Bayhaqī (from Ibn Masʿūd); Bukhārī (from Barāʾ b. ʿĀzib)—
Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn—to Hell. Thus, the beginning and end of man consists of these stages. Allah the Exalted created the world as a place to acquire provisions for the Hereafter, so that humankind may take what is beneficial for them! If humankind takes this provision within the circle of justice, there will be no enmity among them. In such a case, there would be no need for jurists. For where there is no enmity or conflict, there is no work for the jurist. But humankind is attached to the world through their desires. Because of this, it is inevitable that enmities arise among people. Therefore, there is a need for an authority to resolve these enmities. Those who hold authority in governance need laws to manage society.
The jurist is the one who knows the laws related to this governance. It is only through their mediation and means that it is possible to reconcile people who have become hostile due to their desires. Thus, the jurist is the teacher of the sultan and the most important means of conveying the sultan’s policies to the people. The one who can make laws for the people and keep them under control is the jurist. The purpose of organizing the sultan’s policy is to bring order to the worldly life of the people, to regulate their circumstances, and to prevent them from living a disordered and unrestrained life. I swear that the science of fiqh is as much related to the world as it is to religion. But its relation to religion is through the world; for the world is the field of the Hereafter.
Religion is only completed through the world. Kingship and religion are twin brothers. Religion is the essential element, and the sultan is its guardian. It is well known that anything without a foundation and basis is doomed to collapse. It is also clear that property without a guardian will be plundered. Governance and the administration of the people are only possible with the existence of a sultan. The sultan needs jurists in order to judge; for he judges with the laws they have formulated. Managing the sultan and the people is not the primary characteristic of religious knowledge, but only its complement and aid; likewise, knowing the politics that runs the sultanate is the same. It is well known that the ḥajj can only be completed when one is safe from bandits.
But the ḥajj is one thing, and being on the road to ḥajj is another. Having the security of the road, which is a complement to the ḥajj, and having knowledge of its laws and regulations, is yet another thing.
Kitāb al-ʿIlm/Section II.
In summary, the science of fiqh is nothing other than knowing the ways of protection and governance. The proof of this is the following ḥadīth: “Only three people give fatwā (legal verdicts) to the people: the amīr (ruler), the official appointed by the amīr, or the one who, trusting in his own knowledge, considers himself obliged to perform this duty!” The amīr who gives fatwā is the head of state. For in the time of the righteous predecessors (salaf al-ṣāliḥīn), the heads of state were also those who gave fatwā. The officials who dealt with government affairs were the deputies of the head of state. The third are those who, apart from the amīr and the official, voluntarily undertake this duty even though there is no need. The Companions (ṣaḥāba) avoided giving fatwā. In fact, if someone asked a question, they would refer the questioner to another Companion in order not to answer.
Everyone acted in this way and avoided giving fatwā. But when asked about the Qur’an and the states of the Hereafter, they would answer without hesitation or weariness. In some narrations of the above ḥadīth, instead of “the one who, trusting in his own knowledge, considers himself obliged,” the word “muraʾī” (one who gives fatwā out of ostentation and whose fatwā is not needed) is used. Indeed, the one who shows off by giving fatwā on his own initiative puts his taqwa (God-consciousness) in danger; such people act this way to gain rank and wealth. For if they did not have such an intention, they would avoid exposing themselves to such danger. If the science of fiqh is considered a worldly science because it deals with disputes, responsibilities, punishments, and acts of injury, then its section related to acts of worship such as prayer and fasting, or its section that informs about the lawful and unlawful in transactions, is equally—71) Ibn Mājah (from ʿAmr b.
Shuʿayb)